۱۳۸۹ مرداد ۷, پنجشنبه

ننگ بر شما ! اهريمن! اهريمن

ايران در آخرين گزارش سازمان جهانی تجارت : ایران با داشتن نفت و گاز، از لحاظ صادرات با فاصله زياد از کشور هايی مثل مالزی، تايلند يا ترکيه عقب هست

گزارش سازمان جهانی تجارت : ایران با داشتن نفت و گاز، از لحاظ صادرات با فاصله زياد از کشور هايی مثل مالزی، تايلند يا ترکيه عقب هست
ايران در آخرين گزارش سازمان جهانی تجارت : ایران با داشتن نفت و گاز، از لحاظ صادرات با فاصله زياد از کشور هايی مثل مالزی، تايلند يا ترکيه عقب هست


راديو فردا : فریدون خاوند (تحلیلگر اقتصادی)، استاد اقتصاد در دانشگاه پاریس در مورد وضعیت ایران در گزارش سازمان جهانی تجارت با رادیو فردا گفت و گو کرده است.

سازمان جهانی تجارت به تازگی گزارش سالانه خودش را منتشر کرده که در آن علاوه بر بررسی رخداد ها و فعا ليت های اين سازمان در سال ۲۰۰۹، و تاثير های بحران جهانی، آماری هم در باره بازرگانی خارجی ايران داده شده است. چه نکات مهمی در اين گزارش ديده ميشود؟


فريدون خاوند - اين گزارش، مثل هر سال، مهم ترين داده های مربوط به بازرگانی بين المللی در سال ماقبل را ارائه ميدهد و بعد می پردازد به يک موضوع اصلی که در گزارش سال ۲۰۱۰، موضوع اصلی اختصاص دارد به داد و ستد مواد اوليه در جهان که طبعا به ايران هم مربوط ميشود.

در مورد داده های عمومی بازرگانی بين المللی، گزارش سازمان جهانی تجارت ميگويد که به دليل بحران بين المللی، برای اولين بار در هفتاد سال گذشته، حجم مبادلات تجاری در سال ۲۰۰۹ بيش از دوازده در صد سقوط کرده، ولی همان گزارش پيش بينی ميکند که در سال جاری ميلادی، اين سقوط تا اندازه ای جبران خواهد شد. مهم ترين قدرت صادر کننده جهان در سال گذشته چين بوده و، و آلمان و آمريکا در اين زمينه به ترتيب دوم و سوم هستند.

در سال ۲۰۰۹، بر پايه همين گزارش، ايران چه نقش و چه جايگاهی داشته در بازرگانی بين المللی؟

صادرات ايران هم، در سال ۲۰۰۹، مثل تقريبا تمام کشور ها، دچار کاهش شده و البته چون بهای نفت کاهش پيدا کرده، حجم صادرات کالا از سوی ايران نسبت به سال ۲۰۰۸، با ۳۱ در صد سقوط، به هفتاد و هشت ميليارد دلار رسيد. البته همين مقدار در آمد ارزی هم بد نيست، چون به ايران اجازه داد ۵۱ ميليارد دلار کالا وارد کند و تازه ۲۷ ميليارد دلار هم مازاد داشته باشد. بر پايه همين گزارش، ايران تنها ۰.۷ در صد صادرات جهان را تامين ميکند و با وجود برخورداری از نفت و گاز، از لحاظ صادرات با فاصله زياد از کشور هايی مثل مالزی، تايلند يا ترکيه عقب هست.

اشاره کرديد به بازرگانی مواد اوليه مثل نفت و گاز که در اين گزرش به آن پرداخته شده. در مورد ايران، چه نکاتی بيشتر جلب توجه ميکند در پيوند با مواد اوليه؟

آمار سازمان جهانی تجارت يک بار ديگر نشان ميدهد که ايران از لحاظ ساختار بازرگانی خارجی اش يک کشور جهان سومی باقی مانده، چون که سهم مواد خام در کل صادراتش ميرسد به ۸۶ در صد که تقريبا تمام آن هم نفت است. در همين گزارش، اشاره ميشود به نفرين مواد اوليه يا انچيزی که به نام بيماری هلندی شهرت دارد و در ايران هم صاحبنظران بسيار به ان پرداخته اند. يک کشور تک محصولی وابسته به صدور يک کالا دارای اقتصادی است بيمار و ميدانيم که رانت حاصل از صدور نفت نه فقط اقتصاد ايران را آلوده کرده، بلکه در همان حال تبديل به مانع بزرگی شده است بر سر دستيابی کشور به مردمسالاری.

پيش بينی بازرگانی بين المللی در سال ۲۰۱۰ در رابطه با مواد اوليه شايد دشوار باشد. پيش بينی شما چيست؟

با توجه به افزايش بهای نفت در سال جاری نسبت به سال گذشته، در آمد های ارزی ايران هم از اين محل بيشتر خواهد شد مگر آنکه تغييراتی در بازرگانی خارجی ايران پيش بيآيد يا آنکه زير فشار تحريم، مشکلاتی در رابطه با صادرات نفت از سوی ايران پيدا بشود.

حکم اعدام جعفرکاظمی، یکی از متهمان پس از انتخابات تایید شد


نسیم غنوی به کمپین بین المللی حقوق بشر درایران گفت که حکم اعدام موکلش جعفرکاظمی در دادگاه تجدیدنظر تایید شده و درخواست اعاده دارسی وی نیز توسط شعبه ۳۱ دیوان عالی رد شده است. این حکم توسط دادگاه تجدید نظر شعبه ۳۶ استان تهران به ریاست حجت الاسلام زرگر تایید شده است.

خانم غنوی گفت که موکلش مدتها درزندان انفرادی بوده ولی از اینکه انواع دیگری فشار بر وی یا خانواده اش آمده باشد مطلع نیست.

جعفر کاظمی، ۴۶ ساله، لیتوگراف کتب درسی و جزوات دانشگاه امیر کبیر، روز ۲۷ شهریور در میدان هفت تیر دستگیر و به سلول انفرادی بند ۲۰۹ منتقل و پس از ۷۴ روز به بند ۳۵۰ زندان اوین منتقل شد. جعفر کاظمی پیش از این نیز از سال ۱۳۶۰ تا اواخر سال ۱۳۶۹ زندانی بوده است. رودابه اکبری،همسر جعفر کاظمی، طی نامه‌ای از دبیر کل سازمان ملل برای متوقف کردن حکم اعدام همسرش کمک خواسته است. وی ابتدا در شعبه ۲۸ دادگاه انقلاب محاکمه شده بود.

خانم غنوی پیرامون اتهام موکل اش گفت: «جعفر کاظمی، متهم به محاربه از طریق هواداری گروه مجاهدین است اگرچه هیچ یک از بازجویی­ها اتهامات وارده را نپذیرفته است.»

وی افزود: « اتهام محاربه از جمله جرائمی است که قانونگذار باید شرایط فقهی را به سبب این که ریشه فقهی دارد لحاظ کند؛ از جمله این که اقدام مسلحانه هست که اکثر علمای شیعه معتقدند محارب به کسی می گویند که دست به سلاح ببرد. در مورد موکل من این طور نبوده، ایشان صرفا در اجتماعات بعد از انتخابات حضور داشته است و احتمال دارد شعارهایی داده باشد اما به عنوان وکیل معتقد هستم بحث محاربه در مورد ایشان اصلا مصداق پیدا نمی کند.»

نسیم غنوی در خصوص دفاعیات مطرح شده در دادگاه گفت: «متأسفانه نه دادگاه بدوی به دفاعیات ما توجه کرد نه تجدید نظر و دیوان هم همین طور و بحث محاربه را در مورد ایشان صادق دانستند.» به گفته وکیل این پرونده، حکم جعفر کاظمی در اجرای احکام است و از نظر قانونی هیچ اقدامی برای نجات جان جعفر کاظمی در حال حاضر، میسری نیست.»

توزیع غذای آده در بند ویژه روحانیت



خبرگزری هرانا - زندانیان محبوس در بند ویژه روحانیت روز سه شنبه مورخ ۴ مردادماه سال جاری به دلیل تداوم توزیع غذای آلوده در این بند از خوردن غذای زندان امتناع کردند.

بنا به اطلاع گزارشگران هرانا، توزیع غذای آلوده و وجود انواع جانوران و حشرات در غذای زندان به روندی عادی تبدیل شده است این روند تا جایی ادامه داشت که روز سه شنبه 5 مردادماه، در غذای زندانیان این بند چند حیوان (مارمولک) پیدا شده است. شواهد حاکی از آن است که برخی از زندانیان به دلیل دیر متوجه شدن این موضوع، دچار عوارض روحی و جسمی خوردن غذای آلوده شده و به بهداری زندان منتقل شدند.

هم چنین، صبح امروز 5 شنبه، در واکنش به اعتراض زندانیان یکی از مسئولین زندان دراین بند حاضر شده و به جای رسیدگی به موضوع، آنرا حادثه ای اتفاقی عنوان داشته است.

لازم به ذکر است زندانیان بند ویژه روحانیت که آیت الله کاظمینی بروجردی از روحانیون سرشناس و معترض جزو آنان است از روز سه شنیه تا کنون از خوردن غذاهای زندان امتناع نموده اند که این امتناع با توجه به نبود تغذیه مناسب، زندانیان را با مشکلات عدیده ای مواجه کرده است.

انتشار گزارش ۱۴۵ صفحه اى قاضی رابرتسون در باره كشتارهاى سال ۶۷


راديو فردا، شهران طبری : بنياد عبدالرحمان برومند همراه با انتشار گزارش حقوقى قاضى جفرى رابرتسون، خبرنامه اى در سه صفحه نيز منتشر كرده و در آن مى نويسد: وظيفه اصلى اين بنياد حفظ خاطره قربانيان سياسى، اعاده حيثيت از آنها و دفاع از حقوق بازماندگانشان است و مى افزايد بدين منظور از قاضى رابرتسون كيوسى، مولف كتاب «جنايت عليه بشريت» و كتب ديگر كه تا حال دست كم ۲۰۰ پژوهش براى دادگاه هاى حقوق بشر، مجلس لردها، دادگاه عالى كيفرى و دادگاه هاى ديگر تهيه كرده خواسته است تا با مراجعه به اسناد اين بنياد و اسناد موجود ديگر تحقيقى درباره كشتارهاى سياسى سال ۱۳۶۷ در ايران انجام دهد.

قاضى رابرتسون در اين پژوهش حقوقى ۱۴۵ صفحه اى كه روز چهارشنبه، ششم مردادماه، منتشر شد با ذكر نام و با سند و مدرك، مسئولان وقت جمهوری اسلامی ایران را به جنايت عليه بشريت و نسل كشى متهم كرده و سازمان ملل را به پيگيرى قضايى این افراد دعوت کرده است.

اين پژوهش را بنياد عبدالرحمان برومند در سالروز اعتراض به انتخابات سال ۱۳۸۸ ايران به صورت الكترونيكى منتشر كرده و در پى واكنش هايى كه به آن شد پاسخى نيز در خبرنامه ضميمه آن به چاپ رسانده است.

نکات مهم پژوهش

يكى از نكات مهم اين پژوهش حق و حقوق خانواده هاى قربانيان سال ۱۳۶۷ و دينى است كه از نظر دادگاه بين المللى حقوق بشر، حكومت ايران نسبت به اين خانواده ها دارد.

دكتر لادن برومند، مدير مطالعاتى بنياد، در اين رابطه به راديو فردا مى گويد: «از نظر حقوق بين الملل وقتى جنايتى عليه بشريت اتفاق مى افتد و يا دولتى از قدرت خود سوء استفاده مى كند، اين حكومت موظف است به قربانيان غرامت بپردازد. طبيعتاً بازماندگان قربانيان افراد محقى در اين رابطه هستند. جفرى رابرتسون به نكته اى اشاره كرده كه كمتر به آن اشاره مى شود، اين كه در كشتارهايى مانند كشتار زندان ها در سال ۶۷ مسئله فقط كسانى كه كشته مى شوند نيست، بلكه مسئله خانواده هايى مطرح است كه تحت شكنجه دولتى قرار مى گيرند و اطلاعات لازم به آنها داده نمى شود. آنها درباره چگونگى اعدام و محاكمه عزيزانشان هيچ خبرى ندارند، در مورد تاريخ كشته شدن و محل دفن آنها نيز چيزى نمى دانند و تمام اينها از منظر حقوق بين الملل شكنجه بازماندگان و خانواده ها شناخته شده است. آنها نه فقط به اين دليل كه بازمانده قربانى هستند حق درخواست غرامت دارند و دولت بايد از آنها معذرت بخواهد، بلكه خودشان هم به خاطر صدمات روحى كه ديده اند اين حق را دارند.»

يكى ديگر از نكات مهمى كه در اين گزارش به آن پرداخته شده، آن است كه جنايت عليه بشريت هرگز شامل مرور زمان نمى شود و حتى اگر سال ها از وقوع آن بگذرد مجرمين در هر كجا باشند تحت تعقيب قرار خواهند گرفت.

دكتر لادن برمند همين موضوع را دليل انتشار الكترونيكى اين گزارش در سالگرد اعتراض به انتخابات سال ۸۸ مى خواند و مى گويد: «بعضى ها فكر مى كردند ما به چه دليلى اين تحقيق كه در مورد كشتار سال ۶۷ است را در سالگرد انتخابات سال ۸۸ به زبان انگليسى منتشر مى كنيم. در واقع به اين دليل آن را منتشر كرديم تا هشدارى باشد به كسانى كه امروز در حكومت جمهورى اسلامى تصميم گيرنده هستند به خصوص دستگاه قضايى و انتظامى. آنها بايد بدانند جناياتى كه در سال ۱۳۶۷ رخ داده هنوز موضوع پيگيرى قضايى است و شامل مرور زمان نشده است و موقعى كه دستور سركوب، كشتار، اعدام يا تيراندازى به مردم را مى دهند بايد آگاه باشند كه اين عمل امروزشان فردا مورد پيگيرد قضايى در سطح بين الملل خواهد بود. اين مسئله مهم است كه تعريف اين جنايات به عنوان جنايت عليه بشريت، مسئولان جمهورى اسلامى را نه فقط در برابر ملت خودشان پاسخگو مى كند بلكه در مقابل جامعه بين الملل نيز مسئول خواهند بود و جامعه بين المللى موظف است اين موارد را مورد پيگرد قضايى قرار دهد. به همين دليل جفرى رابرتسون نه تنها از سازمان ملل بلكه از كشورهايى كه قوانين شان اجازه مى دهد عليه مجرمين جنايت عليه بشريت شكايت كنند، خواستار واكنش شديد در مورد كشتار سال ۶۷ شده است.»

انتشار نسخه الكترونيكى قاضى رابرتسون به مناسبت سالگرد اعتراض نسبت به انتخابات رياست جمهورى سال گذشته بحث قابل توجهى را شايد براى اولين بار در عرصه سياسى جامعه ايران و بين هواداران دموكراسى مطرح كرد؛ بحث «انتخاب بين حقيقت و مصلحت».

دكتر لادن برومند در توضيح اين بحث مى گويد: «با انتشار اين گزارش به زبان انگليسى بحثى ميان ايرانيان و طرفداران جنبش سبز ايجاد شد كه آيا صلاح بود در اين شرايط شما به دورانى اشاره كنيد كه آقاى موسوى مسئوليت سياسى مهمى داشته است و ايشان را كه اكنون رهبرى جنبش سبز را به عهده دارد از طرف ديگر مورد فشار و اتهام قرار دهيم. اين بحث مهمى بود و ميان كسانى كه آن را دنبال مى كردند بعضى ها مى گفتند حقيقت بايد در هر صورت مطرح شود و بعضى ها مى گفتند اكنون صلاح نيست و بايد تمركز نيروها روى نجات دادن افرادى باشد كه هم اكنون در زندان ها تحت شكنجه هستند نه كسانى كه ۲۰ سال پيش كشته شدند.»

وى مى افزايد: «به نظر من اين بحث كاذب است زيرا همان طور كه ما در خبرنامه گفتيم هر گاه شما اصل ارجحيت مصلحت را بر حقيقت تقويت كنيد، اين اصل جاى ديگر و در شرايط و مقطع تاريخى و سياسى ديگر گريبانگير شما خواهد شد. كما اين كه اگر در آن دوره كسانى كه در درون نظام مخالف اين كشتار بودند، همان طور كه آقاى منتظرى اين كار را انجام داد، افكار عمومى را شاهد مى گرفتند و با اين امر مخالفت و مبارزه مى كردند اولاً هزاران جوان بى گناه و سرمايه مملكت از بين نمى رفتند و دوماً امروز مسئله جنايت عليه بشريت مطرح نمى شد، همان طور كه امروز آقايان موسوى و كروبى در مظان اتهام قرار دارند كه مصلحت نظام را فداى بيان حقيقت در مورد كهريزك و شكنجه ها و كشتار مردم بعد از انتخابات كردند كه به نظر من كار بسيار درستى كردند.»

خانم برومند می گوید: «اين كه در شرايط فعلى اين كار، رهبرى نهضت سبز را تضعيف مى كند من اين گونه فكر نمى كنم، كما اين كه آقاى منتظرى زمانى كه به عنوان جانشين ولى فقيه و يكى از نظريه پردازان ولايت فقيه و قدرت هاى مهم در جمهورى اسلامى بود از موقعيت و مقام خود گذشت به خاطر آن چه فكر مى كرد حقيقت است. درست است كه آن زمان بهاى زيادى پرداخت اما اگر امروز آقاى منتظرى زنده بود و سران جمهورى اسلامى به پاسخگويى و محاكمه فراخوانده مى شدند مطمئناً بسيارى از زندانيان به نفع او شهادت مى دادند و به دليل خدمتى كه به حقيقت كرد از بوته امتحان سربلند بيرون مى آمد و تاريخ هميشه در اين رابطه از او قدردانى خواهد كرد. در مورد آقاى موسوى هم همين گونه است. يكى از كمبودهايى كه آقاى رابرتسون در تحقيقات خود با آن مواجه شد اين بود كه از طرف افرادى كه در رژيم مسئوليتى داشتند البته به غير از آقاى منتظرى، اطلاعات زيادى در دست نيست و سايرين همه سكوت كرده اند.»

In Disclosing Secret Documents, WikiLeaks Seeks ‘Transparency



WikiLeaks.org, the online organization that posted tens of thousands of classified military field reports about the Afghan war on Sunday, says its goal in disclosing secret documents is to reveal “unethical behavior” by governments and corporations

Since it was founded in December 2006, WikiLeaks has exposed internal memos about the


dumping of toxic material off the African coast, the membership rolls of a racist British party, and the American military’s manual for operating its prison in Guantánamo Bay, Cuba.

“We believe that transparency in government activities leads to reduced corruption, better government and stronger democracies,” the organization’s Web site says. “All governments can benefit from increased scrutiny by the world community, as well as their own people. We believe this scrutiny requires information.”

The trove of war reports posted Sunday dwarfs the scope and volume of documents that the organization has made public in the past.

In a telephone interview from London, the organization’s founder, Julian Assange, said the documents would reveal broader and more pervasive levels of violence in Afghanistan than the military or the news media had previously reported. “It shows not only the severe incidents but the general squalor of war, from the death of individual children to major operations that kill hundreds,” he said.

WikiLeaks withheld some 15,000 documents from release until its technicians could redact names of individuals in the reports whose safety could be jeopardized.

WikiLeaks’ critics range from the military, which says it jeopardizes operations, to some open government advocates who say the organization is endangering the privacy rights of others in favor of self promotion.

Steven Aftergood, head of the project on government secrecy at the Federation of American Scientists, in his blog posting on June 28 accused WikiLeaks of “information vandalism” with no regard for privacy or social usefulness. “WikiLeaks must be counted among the enemies of open society because it does not respect the rule of law nor does it honor the rights of individuals,” he wrote.

The release of the data comes nearly three weeks after new charges were filed against an American soldier in Iraq who had been arrested on charges of leaking a video of a deadly American helicopter attack in Baghdad in 2007 that killed 12 people, including a reporter and photographer from the news agency Reuters. He was also charged with downloading more than 150,000 highly classified diplomatic cables.

WikiLeaks made public a 38-minute video of the helicopter attack as well as a 17-minute edited version that it called “Collateral Murder.” The abridged version drew criticism for failing to make clear that the attacks happened during clashes in a Baghdad neighborhood and that one of the men fired on by the helicopter was carrying a rocket-propelled grenade.

WikiLeaks has also made public a cable entitled “Reykjavik13,” about the banking crisis in Iceland, which was cited in the criminal charges against the soldier, Pfc. Bradley E. Manning, 22, an Army intelligence analyst. In keeping with its policy to protect the anonymity of its sources, WikiLeaks has not acknowledged receiving the cables or video from Private Manning. In the telephone interview, Mr. Assange, an Australian activist, refused to say whether the war reports came from Private Manning. But Mr. Assange said that WikiLeaks had offered to help pay for Private Manning’s legal counsel or provide lawyers to defend him.

Adrian Lamo, a computer hacker who earlier this year traded instant messages with Private Manning, said the soldier claimed he had leaked the cables and video to WikiLeaks. Mr. Lamo, who in 2004 pleaded guilty to hacking into the internal computer system of The New York Times, said he turned in Private Manning to the authorities for national security reasons. Private Manning, who served with the Second Brigade of the 10th Mountain Division, based at Contingency Operating Station Hammer east of Baghdad, was arrested in May after the military authorities said that he had revealed his activities in online chats with Mr. Lamo.

Investigators now believe that Private Manning exploited a loophole in Defense Department security to copy thousands of files onto compact discs over a six-month period.

WikiLeaks has a core group of about half a dozen full-time volunteers, and there are 800 to 1,000 people whom the group can call on for expertise in areas like encryption, programming and writing news releases.

Mr. Assange, 39, said the site operated from servers in several countries, including Sweden and Belgium, where laws provided more protection for its disclosures.

Pakistan Aids Insurgency in Afghanistan, Reports Assert


Pakistan Aids Insurgency in Afghanistan, Reports Assert



Americans fighting the war in Afghanistan have long harbored strong suspicions that Pakistan’s military spy service has guided the Afghan insurgency with a hidden hand, even as Pakistan receives more than $1 billion a year from Washington for its help combating the militants, according to a trove of secret military field reports made public Sunday.

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The documents, made available by an organization called WikiLeaks, suggest that Pakistan, an ostensible ally of the United States, allows representatives of its spy service to meet directly with the Taliban in secret strategy sessions to organize networks of militant groups that fight against American soldiers in Afghanistan, and even hatch plots to assassinate Afghan leaders.

Taken together, the reports indicate that American soldiers on the ground are inundated with accounts of a network of Pakistani assets and collaborators that runs from the Pakistani tribal belt along the Afghan border, through southern Afghanistan, and all the way to the capital, Kabul.

Much of the information — raw intelligence and threat assessments gathered from the field in Afghanistan— cannot be verified and likely comes from sources aligned with Afghan intelligence, which considers Pakistan an enemy, and paid informants. Some describe plots for attacks that do not appear to have taken place.

But many of the reports rely on sources that the military rated as reliable.

While current and former American officials interviewed could not corroborate individual reports, they said that the portrait of the spy agency’s collaboration with the Afghan insurgency was broadly consistent with other classified intelligence.

Some of the reports describe Pakistani intelligence working alongside Al Qaeda to plan attacks. Experts cautioned that although Pakistan’s militant groups and Al Qaeda work together, directly linking the Pakistani spy agency, the Directorate for Inter-Services Intelligence, or ISI, with Al Qaeda is difficult.

The records also contain firsthand accounts of American anger at Pakistan’s unwillingness to confront insurgents who launched attacks near Pakistani border posts, moved openly by the truckload across the frontier, and retreated to Pakistani territory for safety.

The behind-the-scenes frustrations of soldiers on the ground and glimpses of what appear to be Pakistani skullduggery contrast sharply with the frequently rosy public pronouncements of Pakistan as an ally by American officials, looking to sustain a drone campaign over parts of Pakistani territory to strike at Qaeda havens. Administration officials also want to keep nuclear-armed Pakistan on their side to safeguard NATO supplies flowing on routes that cross Pakistan to Afghanistan.

This month, Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton, in one of the frequent visits by American officials to Islamabad, announced $500 million in assistance and called the United States and Pakistan “partners joined in common cause.”

The reports suggest, however, that the Pakistani military has acted as both ally and enemy, as its spy agency runs what American officials have long suspected is a double game — appeasing certain American demands for cooperation while angling to exert influence in Afghanistan through many of the same insurgent networks that the Americans are fighting to eliminate.

Behind the scenes, both Bush and Obama administration officials as well as top American commanders have confronted top Pakistani military officers with accusations of ISI complicity in attacks in Afghanistan, and even presented top Pakistani officials with lists of ISI and military operatives believed to be working with militants.

Benjamin Rhodes, deputy national security adviser for strategic communications, said that Pakistan had been an important ally in the battle against militant groups, and that Pakistani soldiers and intelligence officials had worked alongside the United States to capture or kill Qaeda and Taliban leaders.

Still, he said that the “status quo is not acceptable,” and that the havens for militants in Pakistan “pose an intolerable threat” that Pakistan must do more to address.

“The Pakistani government — and Pakistan’s military and intelligence services — must continue their strategic shift against violent extremist groups within their borders,” he said. American military support to Pakistan would continue, he said.

Several Congressional officials said that despite repeated requests over the years for information about Pakistani support for militant groups, they usually receive vague and inconclusive briefings from the Pentagon and C.I.A.

Nonetheless, senior lawmakers say they have no doubt that Pakistan is aiding insurgent groups. “The burden of proof is on the government of Pakistan and the ISI to show they don’t have ongoing contacts,” said Senator Jack Reed, a Rhode Island Democrat on the Armed Services Committee who visited Pakistan this month and said he and Senator Carl Levin of Michigan, the committee chairman, confronted Pakistan’s prime minister, Yousaf Raza Gilani, yet again over the allegations.

Such accusations are usually met with angry denials, particularly by the Pakistani military, which insists that the ISI severed its remaining ties to the groups years ago. An ISI spokesman in Islamabad said Sunday that the agency would have no comment until it saw the documents. Pakistan’s ambassador to the United States, Husain Haqqani, said, “The documents circulated by WikiLeaks do not reflect the current on-ground realities.”

The man the United States has depended on for cooperation in fighting the militants and who holds most power in Pakistan, the head of the army, Gen. Parvez Ashfaq Kayani, ran the ISI from 2004 to 2007, a period from which many of the reports are drawn. American officials have frequently praised General Kayani for what they say are his efforts to purge the military of officers with ties to militants.

American officials have described Pakistan’s spy service as a rigidly hierarchical organization that has little tolerance for “rogue” activity. But Pakistani military officials give the spy service’s “S Wing” — which runs external operations against the Afghan government and India — broad autonomy, a buffer that allows top military officials deniability.

American officials have rarely uncovered definitive evidence of direct ISI involvement in a major attack. But in July 2008, the C.I.A.’s deputy director, Stephen R. Kappes, confronted Pakistani officials with evidence that the ISI helped plan the deadly suicide bombing of India’s Embassy in Kabul.

From the current trove, one report shows that Polish intelligence warned of a complex attack against the Indian Embassy a week before that bombing, though the attackers and their methods differed. The ISI was not named in the report warning of the attack.

Another, dated August 2008, identifies a colonel in the ISI plotting with a Taliban official to assassinate President Hamid Karzai. The report says there was no information about how or when this would be carried out. The account could not be verified.

General Linked to Militants

Lt. Gen. Hamid Gul ran the ISI from 1987 to 1989, a time when Pakistani spies and the C.I.A. joined forces to run guns and money to Afghan militias who were battling Soviet troops in Afghanistan. After the fighting stopped, he maintained his contacts with the former mujahedeen, who would eventually transform themselves into the Taliban.

And more than two decades later, it appears that General Gul is still at work. The documents indicate that he has worked tirelessly to reactivate his old networks, employing familiar allies like Jaluluddin Haqqani and Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, whose networks of thousands of fighters are responsible for waves of violence in Afghanistan.

General Gul is mentioned so many times in the reports, if they are to be believed, that it seems unlikely that Pakistan’s current military and intelligence officials could not know of at least some of his wide-ranging activities.

For example, one intelligence report describes him meeting with a group of militants in Wana, the capital of South Waziristan, in January 2009. There, he met with three senior Afghan insurgent commanders and three “older” Arab men, presumably representatives of Al Qaeda, who the report suggests were important “because they had a large security contingent with them.”

The gathering was designed to hatch a plan to avenge the death of “Zamarai,” the nom de guerre of Osama al-Kini, who had been killed days earlier by a C.I.A. drone attack. Mr. Kini had directed Qaeda operations in Pakistan and had spearheaded some of the group’s most devastating attacks.

The plot hatched in Wana that day, according to the report, involved driving a dark blue Mazda truck rigged with explosives from South Waziristan to Afghanistan’s Paktika Province, a route well known to be used by the insurgents to move weapons, suicide bombers and fighters from Pakistan.

In a show of strength, the Taliban leaders approved a plan to send 50 Arab and 50 Waziri fighters to Ghazni Province in Afghanistan, the report said.

General Gul urged the Taliban commanders to focus their operations inside Afghanistan in exchange for Pakistan turning “a blind eye” to their presence in Pakistan’s tribal areas. It was unclear whether the attack was ever executed.

The United States has pushed the United Nations to put General Gul on a list of international terrorists, and top American officials said they believed he was an important link between active-duty Pakistani officers and militant groups.

General Gul, who says he is retired and lives on his pension, dismissed the allegations as “absolute nonsense,” speaking by telephone from his home in Rawalpindi, where the Pakistani Army keeps its headquarters. “I have had no hand in it.” He added, “American intelligence is pulling cotton wool over your eyes.”

Senior Pakistani officials consistently deny that General Gul still works at the ISI’s behest, though several years ago, after mounting American complaints, Pakistan’s president at the time, Pervez Musharraf, was forced publicly to acknowledge the possibility that former ISI officials were assisting the Afghan insurgency. Despite his denials, General Gul keeps close ties to his former employers. When a reporter visited General Gul this spring for an interview at his home, the former spy master canceled the appointment. According to his son, he had to attend meetings at army headquarters.

Suicide Bomber Network

The reports also chronicle efforts by ISI officers to run the networks of suicide bombers that emerged as a sudden, terrible force in Afghanistan in 2006.

The detailed reports indicate that American officials had a relatively clear understanding of how the suicide networks presumably functioned, even if some of the threats did not materialize. It is impossible to know why the attacks never came off — either they were thwarted, the attackers shifted targets, or the reports were deliberately planted as Taliban disinformation.

One report, from Dec. 18, 2006, describes a cyclical process to develop the suicide bombers. First, the suicide attacker is recruited and trained in Pakistan. Then, reconnaissance and operational planning gets under way, including scouting to find a place for “hosting” the suicide bomber near the target before carrying out the attack. The network, it says, receives help from the Afghan police and the Ministry of Interior.

In many cases, the reports are complete with names and ages of bombers, as well as license plate numbers, but the Americans gathering the intelligence struggle to accurately portray many other details, introducing sometimes comical renderings of places and Taliban commanders.

In one case, a report rated by the American military as credible states that a gray Toyota Corolla had been loaded with explosives between the Afghan border and Landik Hotel, in Pakistan, apparently a mangled reference to Landi Kotal, in Pakistan’s tribal areas. The target of the plot, however, is a real hotel in downtown Kabul, the Ariana.

“It is likely that ISI may be involved as supporter of this attack,” reads a comment in the report.

Several of the reports describe current and former ISI operatives, including General Gul, visiting madrasas near the city of Peshawar, a gateway to the tribal areas, to recruit new fodder for suicide bombings.

One report, labeled a “real threat warning” because of its detail and the reliability of its source, described how commanders of Mr. Hekmatyar’s insurgent group, Hezb-i-Islami, ordered the delivery of a suicide bomber from the Hashimiye madrasa, run by Afghans.

The boy was to be used in an attack on American or NATO vehicles in Kabul during the Muslim Festival of Sacrifices that opened Dec. 31, 2006. According to the report, the boy was taken to the Afghan city of Jalalabad to buy a car for the bombing, and was later brought to Kabul. It was unclear whether the attack took place.

The documents indicate that these types of activities continued throughout last year. From July to October 2009, nine threat reports detailed movements by suicide bombers from Pakistan into populated areas of Afghanistan, including Kandahar, Kunduz and Kabul.

Some of the bombers were sent to disrupt Afghanistan’s presidential elections, held last August. In other instances, American intelligence learned that the Haqqani network sent bombers at the ISI’s behest to strike Indian officials, development workers and engineers in Afghanistan. Other plots were aimed at the Afghan government.

Sometimes the intelligence documents twin seemingly credible detail with plots that seem fantastical or utterly implausible assertions. For instance, one report describes an ISI plan to use a remote-controlled bomb disguised as a golden Koran to assassinate Afghan government officials. Another report documents an alleged plot by the ISI and Taliban to ship poisoned alcoholic beverages to Afghanistan to kill American troops.

But the reports also charge that the ISI directly helped organize Taliban offensives at key junctures of the war. On June 19, 2006, ISI operatives allegedly met with the Taliban leaders in Quetta, the city in southern Pakistan where American and other Western officials have long believed top Taliban leaders have been given refuge by the Pakistani authorities. At the meeting, according to the report, they pressed the Taliban to mount attacks on Maruf, a district of Kandahar that lies along the Pakistani border.

The planned offensive would be carried out primarily by Arabs and Pakistanis, the report said, and a Taliban commander, “Akhtar Mansoor,” warned that the men should be prepared for heavy losses. “The foreigners agreed to this operation and have assembled 20 4x4 trucks to carry the fighters into areas in question,” it said.

While the specifics about the foreign fighters and the ISI are difficult to verify, the Taliban did indeed mount an offensive to seize control in Maruf in 2006.

Afghan government officials and Taliban fighters have widely acknowledged that the offensive was led by the Taliban commander Mullah Akhtar Muhammad Mansour, who was then the Taliban shadow governor of Kandahar.

Mullah Mansour tried to claw out a base for himself inside Afghanistan, but just as the report quotes him predicting, the Taliban suffered heavy losses and eventually pulled back.

Another report goes on to describe detailed plans for a large-scale assault, timed for September 2007, aimed at the American forward operating base in Managi, in Kunar Province.

“It will be a five-pronged attack consisting of 83-millimeter artillery, rockets, foot soldiers, and multiple suicide bombers,” it says.

It is not clear that the attack ever came off, but its planning foreshadowed another, seminal attack that came months later, in July 2008. At that time, about 200 Taliban insurgents nearly overran an American base in Wanat, in Nuristan, killing nine American soldiers. For the Americans, it was one of the highest single-day tolls of the war.

Tensions With Pakistan

The flood of reports of Pakistani complicity in the insurgency has at times led to barely disguised tensions between American and Pakistani officers on the ground.

Meetings at border outposts set up to develop common strategies to seal the frontier and disrupt Taliban movements reveal deep distrust among the Americans of their Pakistani counterparts.

On Feb. 7, 2007, American officers met with Pakistani troops on a dry riverbed to discuss the borderlands surrounding Afghanistan’s Khost Province.

According to notes from the meeting, the Pakistanis portrayed their soldiers as conducting around-the-clock patrols. Asked if he expected a violent spring, a man identified in the report as Lt. Col. Bilal, the Pakistani officer in charge, said no. His troops were in firm control.

The Americans were incredulous. Their record noted that there had been a 300 percent increase in militant activity in Khost before the meeting.

“This comment alone shows how disconnected this particular group of leadership is from what is going on in reality,” the notes said.

The Pakistanis told the Americans to contact them if they spotted insurgent activity along the border. “I doubt this would do any good,” the American author of the report wrote, “because PAKMIL/ISI is likely involved with the border crossings.” “PAKMIL” refers to the Pakistani military.

A year earlier, the Americans became so frustrated at the increase in roadside bombs in Afghanistan that they hand-delivered folders with names, locations, aerial photographs and map coordinates to help the Pakistani military hunt down the militants the Americans believed were responsible.

Nothing happened, wrote Col. Barry Shapiro, an American military liaison officer with experience in both Afghanistan and Pakistan, after an Oct. 13, 2006, meeting. “Despite the number of reports and information detailing the concerns,” Colonel Shapiro wrote, “we continue to see no change in the cross-border activity and continue to see little to no initiative along the PAK border” by Pakistan troops. The Pakistani Army “will only react when asked to do so by U.S. forces,” he concluded.

Carlotta Gall contributed reporting.

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The Conflict in Afghanistan

  • 1979 The Soviet Union invades Afghanistan. Mujahedeen — Islamic fighters — from across the globe, including Osama bin Laden, come to fight Soviet forces.
  • 1989 Last Soviet troops leave Afghanistan.
  • 1996 The Taliban take control of Afghanistan, imposing fundamentalist Islamic law. Osama bin Laden takes refuge in the country.
  • Sept. 2001 After the 9/11 attacks, President George W. Bush gives the Taliban an ultimatum to hand over bin Laden; the Taliban refuse, and in October the U.S. leads a campaign that drives the Taliban out of major Afghan cities by the end of the year.
  • 2002 Hamid Karzai becomes interim president of Afghanistan. The Taliban continue to wage guerrilla warfare near the border with Pakistan.
  • 2004 New constitution is ratified, making Afghanistan an Islamic state with a strong president. Later, Mr. Karzai wins the country’s first presidential election.
  • Feb. 2009 President Obama orders 17,000 additional troops to Afghanistan.
  • Aug. 2009 President Karzai wins re-election in a vote marred by fraud.
  • Dec. 2009 President Obama issues orders to send 30,000 troops in 2010, bringing the total American force to about 100,000.

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Nadeem Khan/Agence France-Presse — Getty Images

Lt. Gen. Hamid Gul, center, the former head of Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence, was arrested during a 2007 demonstration.

Sunday, July 26 5pm EST.


WikiLeaks today released over 75,000 secret US military reports covering the war in Afghanistan.

The Afghan War Diary an extraordinary secret compendium of over 91,000 reports covering the war in Afghanistan from 2004 to 2010. The reports describe the majority of lethal military actions involving the United States military. They include the number of persons internally stated to be killed, wounded, or detained during each action, together with the precise geographical location of each event, and the military units involved and major weapon systems used.

The Afghan War Diary is the most significant archive about the reality of war to have ever been released during the course of a war. The deaths of tens of thousands is normally only a statistic but the archive reveals the locations and the key events behind each most of these deaths. We hope its release will lead to a comprehensive understanding of the war in Afghanistan and provide the raw ingredients necessary to change its course.

Most entries have been written by soldiers and intelligence officers listening to reports radioed in from front line deployments. However the reports also contain related information from Marines intelligence, US Embassies, and reports about corruption and development activity across Afghanistan.

Each report consists of the time and precise geographic location of an event that the US Army considers significant. It includes several additional standardized fields: The broad type of the event (combat, non-combat, propaganda, etc.); the category of the event as classified by US Forces, how many were detained, wounded, and killed from civilian, allied, host nation, and enemy forces; the name of the reporting unit and a number of other fields, the most significant of which is the summary - an English language description of the events that are covered in the report.

The Diary is available on the web and can be viewed in chronological order and by by over 100 categories assigned by the US Forces such as: "escalation of force", "friendly-fire", "development meeting", etc. The reports can also be viewed by our "severity" measure-the total number of people killed, injured or detained. All incidents have been placed onto a map of Afghanistan and can be viewed on Google Earth limited to a particular window of time or place. In this way the unfolding of the last six years of war may be seen.

The material shows that cover-ups start on the ground. When reporting their own activities US Units are inclined to classify civilian kills as insurgent kills, downplay the number of people killed or otherwise make excuses for themselves. The reports, when made about other US Military units are more likely to be truthful, but still down play criticism. Conversely, when reporting on the actions of non-US ISAF forces the reports tend to be frank or critical and when reporting on the Taliban or other rebel groups, bad behavior is described in comprehensive detail. The behavior of the Afghan Army and Afghan authorities are also frequently described.

The reports come from US Army with the exception most Special Forces activities. The reports do not generally cover top-secret operations or European and other ISAF Forces operations. However when a combined operation involving regular Army units occurs, details of Army partners are often revealed. For example a number of bloody operations carried out by Task Force 373, a secret US Special Forces assassination unit, are exposed in the Diary -- including a raid that lead to the death of seven children.

This archive shows the vast range of small tragedies that are almost never reported by the press but which account for the overwhelming majority of deaths and injuries.

We have delayed the release of some 15,000 reports from total archive as part of a harm minimization process demanded by our source. After further review, these reports will be released, with occasional redactions, and eventually, in full, as the security situation in Afghanistan permits.

Additional information from our media partners:



Afghan War Diary - Reading guide

The Afghan War Diary (AWD for short) consists of messages from several important US military communications systems. The messaging systems have changed over time; as such reporting standards and message format have changed as well. This reading guide tries to provide some helpful hints on interpretation and understanding of the messages contained in the AWD.

Most of the messages follow a pre-set structure that is designed to make automated processing of the contents easier. It is best to think of the messages in the terms of an overall collective logbook of the Afghan war. The AWD contains the relevant events, occurrences and intelligence experiences of the military, shared among many recipients. The basic idea is that all the messages taken together should provide a full picture of a days important events, intelligence, warnings, and other statistics. Each unit, outpost, convoy, or other military action generates report about relevant daily events. The range of topics is rather wide: Improvised Explosives Devices encountered, offensive operations, taking enemy fire, engagement with possible hostile forces, talking with village elders, numbers of wounded, dead, and detained, kidnappings, broader intelligence information and explicit threat warnings from intercepted radio communications, local informers or the afghan police. It also includes day to day complaints about lack of equipment and supplies.

The description of events in the messages is often rather short and terse. To grasp the reporting style, it is helpful to understand the conditions under which the messages are composed and sent. Often they come from field units who have been under fire or under other stressful conditions all day and see the report-writing as nasty paperwork, that needs to be completed with little apparent benefit to expect. So the reporting is kept to the necessary minimum, with as little type-work as possible. The field units also need to expect questions from higher up or disciplinary measures for events recorded in the messages, so they will tend to gloss over violations of rules of engagement and other problematic behavior; the reports are often detailed when discussing actions or interactions by enemy forces. Once it is in the AWD messages, it is officially part of the record - it is subject to analysis and scrutiny. The truthfulness and completeness especially of descriptions of events must always be carefully considered. Circumstances that completely change the meaning of an reported event may have been omitted.

The reports need to answer the critical questions: Who, When, Where, What, With whom, by what Means and Why. The AWD messages are not addressed to individuals but to groups of recipients that are fulfilling certain functions, such as duty officers in a certain region. The systems where the messages originate perform distribution based on criteria like region, classification level and other information. The goal of distribution is to provide those with access and the need to know, all of the information that relevant to their duties. In practice, this seems to be working imperfectly. The messages contain geo-location information in the forms of latitude-longitude, military grid coordinates and region.

The messages contain a large number of abbreviations that are essential to understanding its contents. When browsing through the messages, underlined abbreviations pop up an little explanation, when the mouse is hovering over it. The meanings and use of some shorthands have changed over time, others are sometimes ambiguous or have several meanings that are used depending on context, region or reporting unit. If you discover the meaning of a so far unresolved acronym or abbreviations, or if you have corrections, please submit them to wl-office@sunshinepress.org.

An especially helpful reference to names of military units and task-forces and their respective responsibilities can be found at http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/enduring-freedom.htm

The site also contains a list of bases, airfields http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/facility/afghanistan.htm Location names are also often shortened to three-character acronyms.

Messages may contain date and time information. Dates are mostly presented in either US numeric form (Year-Month-Day, e.g. 2009-09-04) or various Euro-style shorthands (Day-Month-Year, e.g. 2 Jan 04 or 02-Jan-04 or 2jan04 etc.).

Times are frequently noted with a time-zone identifier behind the time, e.g. "09:32Z". Most common are Z (Zulu Time, aka. UTC time zone), D (Delta Time, aka. UTC + 4 hours) and B (Bravo Time, aka UTC + 2 hours). A full list off time zones can be found here: http://www.timeanddate.com/library/abbreviations/timezones/military/

Other times are noted without any time zone identifier at all. The Afghanistan time zone is AFT (UTC + 4:30), which may complicate things further if you are looking up messages based on local time.

Finding messages relating to known events may be complicated by date and time zone shifting; if the event is in the night or early morning, it may cause a report to appear to be be misfiled. It is advisable to always look through messages before and on the proceeding day for any event.

David Leigh, the Guardian's investigations editor, explains the online tools they have created to help you understand the secret US military files on the war in Afghanistan: http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/datablog/video/2010/jul/25/afghanistan-war-logs-video-tutorial

Understanding the structure of the report
  • The message starts with a unique ReportKey; it may be used to find messages and also to reference them.
  • The next field is DateOccurred; this provides the date and time of the event or message. See Time and Date formats for details on the used formats.
  • Type contains typically a broad classification of the type of event, like Friendly Action, Enemy Action, Non-Combat Event. It can be used to filter for messages of a certain type.
  • Category further describes what kind of event the message is about. There are a lot of categories, from propaganda, weapons cache finds to various types of combat activities.
  • TrackingNumber Is an internal tracking number.
  • Title contains the title of the message.
  • Summary is the actual description of the event. Usually it contains the bulk of the message content.
  • Region contains the broader region of the event.
  • AttackOn contains the information who was attacked during an event.
  • ComplexAttack is a flag that signifies that an attack was a larger operation that required more planning, coordination and preparation. This is used as a quick filter criterion to detect events that were out of the ordinary in terms of enemy capabilities.
  • ReportingUnit, UnitName, TypeOfUnit contains the information on the military unit that authored the report.
  • Wounded and death are listed as numeric values, sorted by affiliation. WIA is the abbreviation for Wounded In Action. KIA is the abbreviation for Killed In Action. The numbers are recorded in the fields FriendlyWIA,FriendlyKIA,HostNationWIA,HostNationKIA,CivilianWIA,CivilianKIA,EnemyWIA,EnemyKIA
  • Captured enemies are numbered in the field EnemyDetained.
  • The location of events are recorded in the fields MGRS (Military Grid Reference System), Latitude, Longitude.
  • The next group of fields contains information on the overall military unit, like ISAF Headquarter, that a message originated from or was updated by. Updates frequently occur when an analysis group, like one that investigated an incident or looked into the makeup of an Improvised Explosive Device added its results to a message.
  • OriginatorGroup, UpdatedByGroup
  • CCIR Commander's Critical Information Requirements
  • If an activity that is reported is deemed "significant", this is noted in the field Sigact. Significant activities are analyzed and evaluated by a special group in the command structure.
  • Affiliation describes if the event was of friendly or enemy nature.
  • DColor controls the display color of the message in the messaging system and map views. Messages relating to enemy activity have the color Red, those relating to friendly activity are colored Blue.
  • Classification contains the classification level of the message, e.g. Secret

Help us extend and defend this work

۱۳۸۹ مرداد ۶, چهارشنبه

دستگیری وکیل پرونده سنگسار را متوقف کنید



بیخبری از محمد مصطفایی ، اعضاء خانوادهء وی گروگان گرفته شده اند چهار شنبه ۶ مرداد ۱۳۸۹ - ۲۸ ژوييه ۲۰۱۰


[مرداد ۱۳۸۹ – کمپین بین المللی حقوق بشر در ایران امروز گفت که قوه قضائیه ایران باید فورا اقدامات خود برای دستگیری وکیل حقوق بشر محمد مصطفایی را متوقف کند. فعالیت های اخیر محمد مصطفایی در راستای دفاع از موکلش سکینه آشتیانی که به جرم زنا محکوم به سنگسار شده است مورد توجه بین المللی قرار گرفته است.

در اقداماتی که مصداق ابزار فشار برای وادار کردن محمد مصطفایی به معرفی خویش تعبیر می شود، همسر آقای مصطفایی، فرشته حلیمی و برادر وی، فرهاد حلیمی، که هیچ یک در فعالیتهای حقوق بشری دخیل نیستند با فاصلهء کوتاهی ازآخرین احضار مصطفایی در تاریخ شنبه ، دوم مردادماه ۱۳۸۹ دستگیر شده اند. از مکان دقیق مصطفایی اطلاعی در دست نیست.
هادی قائمی سخنگوی کمپین بین المللی حقوق بشر در ایران گفت: “تلاش آقای مصطفایی علیه سنگسار موکلشان، نقض قوانین نیست. بر عکس، ایشان تلاش در اجرای قانون و حقوق شهرواندان ایران داشته است.”
وی اضافه کرد: “تکاپوی واضح برای توقف فعالیتهای مهم آقای مصطفایی، نقض مستقیم تعهدات بین المللی ایران در زمینهء حقوق بشردر راستای حق دسترسی شهروندان به وکیل دادگستری مستقل است.”
کمپین همچنین خواستار آزادی فوری همسر آقای مصطفایی و برادرش شد که به باور کمپین “گروگانهای ربوده شده هستند.”
در مصاحبه ای با کمپین در تاریخ ۱ مرداد ۱۳۸۹، مصطفایی گفت: ” من هیچ جرمی مرتکب نشده ام که بخواهند من را نگهدارند. کار من به عنوان وکیل دفاع از متهمان است و همه روند کار به صورتی قانونی انجام می شود و هیچ بخشی وجود ندارد که خارج از قانون باشد. من به قانون احترام می گذارم و همواره شان دستگاه قضایی را محترم می شمارم و نگاه حرفه ای در رابطه با کارم دارم و بنابراین دلیلی برای دستگیری وجود ندارد. با این وجود هر احتمالی همواره وجود دارد.”
به دنبال تظاهرات پس از انتخابات ایران، در جریان سرکوب معترضان و فعالان جامعه مدنی چندین وکیل حقوق بشرممنوع الخروج، دستگیر، بازداشت، شکنجه و محاکمه شده اند. این گروه از جمله شامل افرادی مانند محمدعلی دادخواه، شادی صدر و عبدالفتاح سلطانی می باشد. تهدید علیه سایر وکلای حقوق بشر همچنان ادامه دارد.
مقامات قوهء قضا ییه ایران به طور مستمر از ملاقات زندانیان عقیدتی با وکلایشان، دسترسی وکلای آنان به پرونده ها و مدارک دادگاه، و اظهار نظرحقوقی آنان در طول محاکمات جلوگیری می کنند. مطابق اطلاعاتی که از وکلای حقوق بشر به دست کمپین رسیده است، مقامات به برخی زندانیان دستور داده اند تا وکلای خود را تعویض کنند و از ارائهء خدمات حقوقی وکلا برای موکلانشان خودداری کرده اند.
هادی قائمی گفت: “حکم دستگیری محمد مصطفایی مدرک دیگری از تحلیل رفتن حقوق قانونی در ایران است.”